Journal article
Bernhard Reinsberg, Thomas Stubbs, Alexander Kentikelenis
Governance, vol. 35(3), 2022, pp. 689-715
Governance, vol. 35(3), 2022, pp. 689-715
DOI:
10.1111/gove.12605
View PDF
Cite
Cite
APA
Reinsberg, B., Stubbs, T., & Kentikelenis, A. (2022). Unimplementable by design? Understanding (non-)compliance with International Monetary Fund policy conditionality. Governance, 35(3), 689–715.
Chicago/Turabian
Reinsberg, Bernhard, Thomas Stubbs, and Alexander Kentikelenis. “Unimplementable by Design? Understanding (Non-)Compliance with International Monetary Fund Policy Conditionality.” Governance 35, no. 3 (2022): 689–715.
MLA
Reinsberg, Bernhard, et al. “Unimplementable by Design? Understanding (Non-)Compliance with International Monetary Fund Policy Conditionality.” Governance, vol. 35, no. 3, 2022, pp. 689–715.